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I. INTRODUCTION
Citing this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Edmunds
... Pap's accurately notes that, on questions sounding un-
der our state charter, this Court is not bound by decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court on similar federal provisions,
but may find that Pennsylvania provides greater protec-
tion for individual rights. See Edmunds . . . ("we are not
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional
provisions"). Pap's further notes that this Court already
has recognized that our Declaration of Rights was the "di-
rect precursor of the freedom of speech and press," see Ed-
munds... and that this Court has long construed the free-
dom of expression provision in [a]rticle I, § 7 as providing
greater protection of expression than its federal counter-
part. Pap's adds that other states also have provided
greater protection for expression under their state charters
than has been afforded by the U.S. Supreme Court under
the First Amendment.
Justice Ronald Castille1
I would like to thank Dean Ken Gormley of Duquesne University
School of Law for his kind invitation to participate in the celebra-
tion of Chief Justice Ronald Castille's retirement from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, the oldest state high court in the United
States.2 I suppose one might ask what business a law professor
teaching in New Jersey has commenting on Chief Justice Castille
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. I have been a student of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court since I began teaching at Rutgers-
Camden Law School, across the river from Pennsylvania, thirty-five
years ago. I have argued two cases before the court (losing them
both),3 have written about the court fairly extensively,4 the court
1. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 601 (Pa. 2002); see infra notes 14-33 and
accompanying text.
2. Ken Gormley, Foreword: A New Constitutional Vigor for the Nation's Oldest Court,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 215 (1991).
3. Local 22, Phila. Fire Fighters' Union v. Commonwealth, 613 A.2d 522 (Pa. 1992);
Ritter v. Commonwealth, 548 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), aff'd per curiam, 557 A.2d
1064 (Pa. 1989).
4. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Penn-
sylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 541 (1989); State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Problems of
Judicial Enforcement and Legislative Compliance, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987); A "Row of
Shadows" Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to State Constitutional Equality
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has even cited my work on occasion, 5 and, possibly most important,
my wife Alaine S. Williams has practiced extensively before the
court for many years.6 Perhaps these factors provide me with the
"street creds" to make the following comments.
My topic is to review some of the leading state constitutional
opinions written by Chief Justice Castille, and to draw from them
some larger, sometimes national, lessons on the current subject of
state constitutional law. I will review both cases dealing with state
constitutional rights and state constitutional separation/distribu-
tion of power.
Many cases involving state constitutional rights will also involve
federal rights claims. In such situations, our American constitu-
tional rights regime provides a "dual" system of protection for citi-
zens.7 State constitutional rights provisions may actually provide
more protection than their federal counterparts, which provide a
national minimum standard of rights. By contrast, in separation-
of-powers cases, there are no minimum federal standards8 such as
in rights cases, so there should not be any concern about federal
constitutional analysis when a state court resolves its state consti-
tutional separation of powers cases. 9
II. INDEPENDENT RIGHTS UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
CASES WITH BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. State Constitutional Rights
All state constitutions contain rights guarantees that are often
identical or similar to, but sometimes quite different from, the more
Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343 (1993) [hereinafter State Constitutional Equality Doc-
trine].
5. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877
A.2d 383, 408 (Pa. 2005); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Fajt, 876 A.2d 954, 973 n.16 (Pa.
2005); City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 586 n.18, 588-89 (Pa. 2003); Stlip v.
Hafer, 718 A.2d 290, 295 (Pa. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting); Pa. State Ass'n of Jury
Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 615 n.9 (Pa. 2013); In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 660
n.13 (Pa. 2014); Robinson Twp v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 944 n.33 (Pa. 2013) ("Of note
among academic commentary on state constitutionalism, especially regarding Pennsylva-
nia's decisional law, is the work of Professor Robert F. Williams.").
6. See, e.g., Council 13, AFSCME ex rel. Fillman v. Rendell, 986 A.2d 63 (Pa. 2009); see
also infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text; Ziccardi v. Commonwealth, 456 A.2d 979 (Pa.
1982); Odgers v. Commonwealth, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1987); City of Phila. v. District Council
33, AFSCME, 598 A.2d 256 (Pa. 1991); Office of Att'y Gen. v. Council 13 AFSCME, 844 A.2d
1217 (Pa. 2004).
7. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 114 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009).
8. Id. at 240.
9. Id. at 240-42.
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familiar federal constitutional rights. The Declarations of Rights
in the constitutions of the original states such as Pennsylvania pre-
dated the Federal Bill of Rights, and served as models not only for
other states, 10 but for the Federal Bill of Rights itself." How such
state constitutional rights guarantees should be interpreted in
cases that also raise federal constitutional claims has been one of
the most important areas of state constitutional law for several gen-
erations now. This phenomenon is referred to as the New Judicial
Federalism.1 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been a leader
in this movement.1 3
1. Nude Dancing as Protected Expression
In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with
the question of whether nude dancing at a club in Erie was consti-
tutionally protected free expression such that the city ordinance
banning it was unconstitutional.1 4 The challenge to the ordinance
was based on both the Federal First Amendment and the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution's free speech and expression guarantee.15 The
majority of the court ruled that the city ordinance violated the Fed-
eral First Amendment.16 Then-Justice Castille concurred, arguing
that in all likelihood the city ordinance would not violate the First
Amendment, but concluded it must be struck down under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution's free speech and expression guarantee.1 7
Justice Castille saw the state constitution's provision as broader
and more protective than the federal guarantee:
Although I believe that Sections 1(c) and 2 of the Ordinance at
issue here do not fail under the First Amendment in light of
Barnes, I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the ma-
jority since I believe that those provisions must be stricken un-
der [a]rticle I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which pro-
vides: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one
of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
10. Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A Centennial Cel-
ebration, 80 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (1990-91).
11. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BILL OF RIGHTS 53-54, 85-86, 90-91 (1977).
12. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 113.
13. KEN GORMLEY, State Constitutional Law: The Building Blocks, in THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 17 (2004).
14. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie (Pap's 1), 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998).
15. Id. at 276.
16. Id. at 280.
17. Id. at 281 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.).
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speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty. . ." Pa. Const. art. I, § 7. This Court has
repeatedly determined that [a]rticle I, § 7 affords greater pro-
tection to speech and conduct in this Commonwealth than does
its federal counterpart, the First Amendment.
I believe that the dissent authored by Justice White in Barnes
is persuasive and that this Court should adopt it for purposes
of interpreting [a]rticle I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.1 8
Because the majority opinion in Pap's I was based on the U.S.
Constitution, this decision was not based on an "adequate and in-
dependent state ground."19 Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction and might accept the case and decide
the federal constitutional question. This is exactly what hap-
pened.20
2. United States Supreme Court Accepts Jurisdiction and
Reverses
The U.S. Supreme Court, as Justice Castille had predicted, de-
termined the matter was not moot,21 and reversed the Pennsylvania
18. Id. at 283. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1984)
("It is now becoming clear that Supreme Court dissenting opinions may influence the legis-
lative branch or state courts as well as current or future Court majorities. That is, Supreme
Court dissents can and do have a significant impact upon state courts confronting the same
constitutional problem the dissenter believes the Court decided incorrectly. In this sense,
state courts have become a new audience for Supreme Court dissents on federal constitu-
tional questions that may also arise under state constitutions. Thus, dissenters may be vin-
dicated more quickly, but only on a state-by-state basis. One might ask, then, whether Jus-
tice Brennan's and Marshall's dissents, among others, have not enjoyed a much higher vin-
dication rate in state cases than Holmes ever achieved in later Supreme Court decisions.").
For an argument that Justice Brennan's approach does not serve the interests of federalism,
see Earl Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988). Contra Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New
Jersey Supreme Court, and State Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Con-
sciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763 (1998). Justice Brennan made the point about the possible
influence of Supreme Court dissents in developing state constitutional law. William J. Bren-
nan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986).
19. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) ("If the state court decision indi-
cates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision"); see GORMLEY,
supra note 13, at 26; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 122-25.
20. City of Erie v. Pap's, 526 U.S. 1111 (1999) (granting certiorari).
21. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 527 U.S. 1034 (1999) (Pap's had discontinued nude danc-
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Supreme Court's decision in Pap's J.22 The U.S. Supreme Court's
decision was deeply divided, with no majority opinion.23 Of course,
the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to decide state
constitutional questions, so the Court remanded the matter to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.24
Under these circumstances, where the United States Supreme
Court's decision may decide only federal constitutional questions,
and not their state counterparts, and because we have a "double
source of protection" in our federal system, state courts are not re-
quired to interpret their state constitutions in "lockstep" with fed-
eral constitutional interpretations. 25 This is particularly true be-
cause when the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights against the states' it must consider the fact that
it is setting rules for all fifty states, and may possibly be establish-
ing a "least common denominator" of rights because of a form of
deference or "federalism delusion."26
3. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strikes Down City
Ordinance under State Constitution
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, in Pap's II,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated its decision striking
down the Erie ordinance, but this time based the decision on the
state constitution, in an opinion by Justice Castille. 27 Justice Cas-
tille agreed that the case was not moot, 28 and began with the struc-
tured state constitutional analysis established by the landmark de-
cision, Commonwealth v. Edmunds.29 This mandated an approach
to analyzing whether state constitutional rights guarantees should
be interpreted more broadly or protectively than their federal con-
stitutional counterparts. This approach is not applied in an iron-
clad way by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but it does serve to
22. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
23. Id. at 281.
24. Id. at 302.
25. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 113-14.
26. Id. at 173-74; see infra notes 30 and 51.
27. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie (Pap's I1), 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002).
28. Id. at 599-601. Both parties agreed, as did Chief Justice Castille, that the United
States Supreme Court's mootness analysis was not binding on the state court, and he evalu-
ated the issue of mootness under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See also Justice Castille's
opinion in Stilp v. Commonwealth General Assembly, 940 A.2d 1227, 1231-35 (Pa. 2007),
finding no taxpayer standing; see generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive
Virtues"- Rethinking The Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1852-68 (2001);
WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 298-99.
29. Pap's II, 812 A.2d at 603 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991)).
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discipline lawyers and the court when it is deciding whether to "di-
verge" from the United States Supreme Court.30
Justice Castille indicated that the Pennsylvania Constitution's
freedom of expression provision predated the First Amendment and
was broader (stating the right affirmatively rather than nega-
tively).31 He reviewed the special meaning of freedom of expression
in Pennsylvania history, noted that federal law in this area was
quite unclear and still in a state of flux, and emphasized that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be deciding for only the Com-
monwealth, rather than the nation as a whole. 32 Further, he relied
on the reasoning of the dissenting opinions in the U.S. Supreme
Court.33
These are all the kinds of arguments that courts take into account
when trying to determine whether they should "diverge" or "go be-
yond" what the United States Supreme Court has said about federal
constitutional rights. Chief Justice Castille took these arguments
seriously in deciding whether to "disagree" with the United States
Supreme Court.
B. Search and Seizure
Chief Justice Castille has written a number of decisions dealing
with search and seizure, all of which are characterized by state con-
stitutional analysis that is independent of the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Federal Fourth Amendment.
Search and seizure is one of the most common areas of litigation
30. Both Dean Gormley and I have written on Edmunds, he more favorably than I. Com-
pare GORMLEY, supra note 13, at 1, 3-16 with WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 155-57, 169-77. I
have expressed concern that this "criteria approach" can give an unnecessary "presumption
of correctness" to United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting a different constitution
under circumstances where it must be concerned with all fifty states and therefore its deci-
sions might be diluted by federalism concerns. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7 and accompany-
ing text.
31. Pap's II, 812 A. 2d at 603 ("The text of the First Amendment of the [F]ederal Consti-
tution provides, in relevant part, that, 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . . .' U.S. CONST. amend. I. As a purely textual matter, [a]rticle I, § 7 is
broader than the First Amendment in that it guarantees not only freedom of speech and the
press, but specifically affirms the 'invaluable right' to the free communication of thoughts
and opinions, and the right of 'every citizen' to 'speak freely' on 'any subject' so long as that
liberty is not abused. 'Communication' obviously is broader than 'speech."').
32. Id. at 603-05, 611 ("The provision is an ancestor, not a step-child, of the First Amend-
ment.").
33. Id. at 599, 602; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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where lawyers and state courts have looked to their own state con-
stitutions. 34 In this area, by contrast to freedom of expression, Chief
Justice Castille has tended to reach the same conclusions as the
United States Supreme Court in similar search and seizure cases.
This has been true for more than fifteen years. 35 In each of these
decisions Chief Justice Castille applied the Edmunds analysis.
This has been referred to as "reflective adoptionism," where the
state court acknowledges that it may render a more protective de-
cision under the state constitution, analyzes that option, but con-
cludes that it should reach the same conclusion as the United States
Supreme Court.36
For example, in Commonwealth v. Russo,37 the question was
whether a Pennsylvania statute authorizing Game Commission of-
ficers to enter land without a warrant 38 violated either the Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Then-Justice Castille, writing for the majority of a divided court,
considered whether the United States Supreme Court's "open fields
doctrine," should be applied under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 39
Game Commission officers had entered the defendant's property
without a warrant after a tip that he had "baited" his property for
the purpose of hunting bears. Justice Castille carefully evaluated
the United States Supreme Court decisions,40 and concluded:
There can be no question that the search sub judice was lawful
under the Fourth Amendment, given the open fields doctrine.
The issue, however, is whether Pennsylvania has departed, or
should depart, from that doctrine when applying [a]rticle I,
[s]ection 8 of our Constitution. To determine whether the open
fields doctrine as enunciated in Oliver is consonant with [a]rti-
cle I, [s]ection 8, we will undertake an independent analysis of
that provision as guided by our seminal decision in Common-
wealth v. Edmunds .... 41
34. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure Cases,
77 MISS. L. REV. 225 (2007); GORMLEY, supra note 13, at 23; David Rudovsky, Searches and
Seizures, in GORMLEY ETAL., supra note 13, at 299.
35. Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Glass, 754
A.2d 655 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v.
Duncan, 817 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2013).
36. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 197-200.
37. 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007).
38. 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(a)(2).
39. Id.; see also Russo, 934 A.2d at 1200.
40. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1203-05.
41. Id. at 1205; see Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 306-07.
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As indicated, Justice Castille provided a detailed analysis of the
Edmunds factors, and concluded that Pennsylvania constitutional
law in this area should mirror that under the Federal Constitution:
In short, the baseline protections of the Fourth Amendment, in
this particular area, are compatible with Pennsylvania policy
considerations insofar as they may be identified. More im-
portantly, there is nothing in the unique Pennsylvania experi-
ence to suggest that we should innovate a departure from com-
mon law and from federal law and reject the open fields doc-
trine.42
Three Justices dissented, primarily by evaluating the Edmunds
factors differently from Justice Castille. 43
In a recent 2014 decision, 44 Chief Justice Castille followed an ear-
lier decision rejecting the United States Supreme Court's "good
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. 45 While expressing some
misgivings about the court's earlier precedent, 46 he adhered to it. 47
C. Excessive Fines
In 2014, Chief Justice Castille authored the majority opinion in
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg,48 striking down a gambling statute's
mandatory minimum fine of $75,000 for a first offense, as contrary
to the Pennsylvania Constitution's cruel punishments clause. 49
He first reviewed the history of the provision, dating from 1776,
together with its judicial interpretation 0.5  Notably, in a challenge
to an excessive sentence a year earlier (where the state constitu-
tional claim was not adequately raised and argued), Chief Justice
Castille had concurred in the court's federal constitutional analysis,
but stated:
42. Id. at 1213; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038-39 (Pa. 1996).
43. Williams, 692 A.2d at 1213-18. I have observed this phenomenon in other states
that apply what I have called the "criteria approach." WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 168 (noting
that the "[m]ajority and dissent here focus on their disagreement on the application of the
criteria rather than on the content and application of the state constitutional provision at
issue. Is a dissenter's accusation that the majority has misapplied the criteria any different
from an accusation that the majority has simply resorted to the state constitution in a result-
oriented attempt to 'evade' U.S. Supreme Court precedent?").
44. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014).
45. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
46. Johnson, 86 A.3d at 189 n.4.
47. Id. at 191; see also Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 863 A.2d 76, 88-96 (Pa. 2003).
48. 98 A.3d 1268 (Pa. 2014).
49. Id. at 1287 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 13).
50. Id. at 1279-83.
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There is a colorable claim to be made that the federal test for
gross disproportionality should not be followed lockstep in
Pennsylvania, certainly at least insofar as it includes a feder-
alism-based constraint that looks to sentences for similar of-
fenses in other states ... [A] defendant pursuing a Pennsylva-
nia sentencing disproportionality claim may allege that com-
parative and proportional justice is an imperative within Penn-
sylvania's own borders, to be measured by Pennsylvania's com-
parative punishment scheme. In that circumstance, it may be
that the existing Eighth Amendment approach does not suffi-
ciently vindicate the state constitutional value at issue, where
sentencing proportionality is at issue. 51
In the Eisenberg context of excessive fines, Chief Justice Castille
concluded for a unanimous court:
In our view, the fine here, when measured against the conduct
triggering the punishment, and the lack of discretion afforded
the trial court, is constitutionally excessive. Simply put, appel-
lant, who had no prior record, stole $200 from his employer,
which happened to be a casino. There was no violence involved;
there was apparently no grand scheme involved to defraud ei-
ther the casino or its patrons. Employee thefts are unfortu-
nately common; as noted, appellant's conduct, if charged under
the Crimes Code, exposed him to a maximum possible fine of
$10,000. Instead, because appellant's theft occurred at a ca-
sino, the trial court had no discretion, under the Gaming Act,
but to impose a minimum fine of $75,000-an amount that was
375 times the amount of the theft. 52
D. Protection of Reputation
The United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court provides no protection for a person's reputa-
tion. 53 By contrast, in Pennsylvania, the constitution contains a
textual protection for reputation:
All men are born equally free and independent, and have cer-
tain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those
51. Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, C., concurring)
(emphasis added). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1285.
53. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991).
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of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring pro-
cessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursu-
ing their own happiness. 54
In Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P.,55 a defamation action was
brought against a newspaper and reporter by persons who were ac-
cused in newspaper articles of impeding the work of a grand jury, a
criminal offense. 56 In response to the defense raised under the
Pennsylvania Shield Law, 57 the plaintiffs argued for a "crime-fraud"
exception to the statute, along with their reliance on the constitu-
tional protection for their reputation 8.5 Chief Justice Castille, for a
divided court, upheld the Shield Law defense, but specifically
acknowledged the importance of the constitutional right to protec-
tion of reputation:
Our holding does not discount the important interests impli-
cated in every defamation action, notably, the individual's fun-
damental right to his or her reputation as guaranteed under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. The proper balance between
that compelling interest and the Shield Law, however, was al-
ready struck by this Court in Hatchard when it refined our in-
terpretation of the Shield Law. 59
III. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Introduction
Notably, in the area of state constitutional government structure,
by contrast to state constitutional rights, there are virtually no min-
imum standards or "least common denominators" imposed by the
Federal Constitution on the states.60 It is true that the Guarantee
Clause6 l1 requires states to have a "republican form of government,"
but the United States Supreme Court has deemed this nonjusticia-
ble.62 Consequently there need not be any specific influence from
54. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added); see generally Elizabeth Wachman & Ken
Gormley, Inherent Rights of Mankind, in GORMLEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 84.
55. 956 A. 2d 937 (Pa. 2008).
56. Id. at 939-41.
57. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942.
58. Castellani, 956 A.2d at 939, 942.
59. Id. at 953 (citing Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 532 A.2d 346, 348-51 (Pa.
1987)). Justice McCaffery dissented on the basis of article I, section 1. Id. at 954.
60. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 240-42. See also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
61. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
62. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912).
Summer 2015
Duquesne Law Review
the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of federal sepa-
ration/distribution of powers questions.63 State constitutions re-
flect a fairly wide variety of arrangements such as elected versus
appointed judiciaries, plural as opposed to unitary executives, and
even one unicameral legislature. 64 That said, there are not any
wide disparities such as the establishment of a parliamentary sys-
tem of state government. 65
B. Reapportionment and Redistricting
One of the most politically and legally contentious elements of
state government constitutional structure is the internal reappor-
tionment and redistricting of the state legislature. 66 In Holt v. 2011
Legislative Reapportionment Commission,67 Chief Justice Castille
confronted the extremely complex interaction of the 1960's federal
constitutional one-person-one-vote mandate and the state constitu-
tional requirements for the structuring of legislative districts. He
provided a deep analysis of the evolution of reapportionment and
redistricting litigation in Pennsylvania, both before and after the
one-person-one-vote requirement from the United States Supreme
Court. He noted that the state constitutional requirements were
still applicable, if they could be enforced within the supreme federal
mandate.68 Chief Justice Castille noted:
The operative mandates under [a]rticle II, [s]ection 16 are to
devise a legislative map of fifty senatorial and 203 representa-
tive districts, compact and contiguous, as nearly equal in pop-
ulation "as practicable," and which do not fragment political
subdivisions unless "absolutely necessary." Although all of
these commands are of Pennsylvania constitutional magni-
tude, one of the factors, that districts be "as nearly equal in
population as practicable," also exists as an independent com-
mand of federal constitutional law, including decisional law
which changes and evolves. 69
63. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 240-41.
64. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. See Jonathan M. Zasloff, Why No Parliaments in the United States?, 35 U. PENN. J.
INT'L LAW 269 (2013).
66. See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons From State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (2006); David
Schultz, Redistricting and the New Judicial Federalism: Reapportionment Litigation Under
State Constitutions, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1087 (2006).
67. 38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012).
68. Id. at 759-60.
69. Id. at 738.
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C. Governor's Item Veto
Although the United States Constitution does not provide the
President with an "item veto," virtually all of the state constitutions
authorize governors to veto parts or "items" of appropriations
bills.70 Pennsylvania's Constitution is no exception. 71 Important
questions, concerning the relationship between executive and legis-
lative branches, refereed by the judiciary, have arisen in many
states concerning two key questions under their item veto provi-
sions: (1) What is an appropriation bill? and (2) What is an item? 72
In Jubelirer v. Rendell,73 Chief Justice Castille confronted the sec-
ond question: "[W]hether [a]rticle IV, [s]ection 16 of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution ... permits the Governor, when presented with an
appropriation bill, to delete portions of the language defining a spe-
cific appropriation without disapproving the funds with which the
language is associated."74
It is very common for legislators to insert substantive language
into appropriation bills. This technique, though common, is prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, such budget legislation goes
through different committees from those that have jurisdiction over
the substantive area affected by the language in the appropriation
bill. This bypasses the expertise developed by the members of those
committees. Second, major appropriations legislation must be en-
acted to fund the ongoing activities of state government. Therefore,
insertion of substantive language in such legislation is oftentimes
more likely to pass than if it were contained in an ordinary bill, that
was referred to the committee with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Finally, insertion of such language in appropriation bills
challenges the governor's use of the item veto, thus raising thorny
questions of constitutional interpretation in clashes between the
legislature and the executive.
Jubelirer was such a case. Notably, the legislative challengers to
the governor's use of the item veto briefed the matter in accordance
with the Edmunds criteria. Chief Justice Castille, writing for a
unanimous court, responded:
70. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171 (1993).
71. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
72. Briffault, supra note 70, at 1174-75.
73. 953 A.2d 514, 517 (Pa. 2008).
74. Id. at 517. "Given the parties' agreement that the 2005 GAA is an appropriation
bill-which it obviously is-their dispute boils down to the meaning of 'item' for purposes of
Section 16-i.e, that of which the Governor may disapprove." Id. at 529.
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The question presented in Edmunds involved the possible ten-
sion between federal and Pennsylvania constitutional law.
In contrast, this Court is sometimes presented with cases re-
quiring us to interpret a provision of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution that lacks a counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. In
such cases, because there is no federal constitutional text or
federal caselaw to consider, we have not engaged in the four-
factor analysis set forth in Edmunds.
Because there is no counterpart to [s]ection 16 in the U.S. Con-
stitution -and thus there is no comparative constitutional ar-
gument forwarded-the instant case falls into that category of
constitutional cases that does not lend itself well to the tradi-
tional Edmunds analysis. 75
Moving to the substance of the controversy, Chief Justice Cas-
tille, as with most of his opinions, carefully reviewed the arguments
of the parties noting the governor's argument that "if the General
Assembly puts in a condition restricting the use of a specific appro-
priation, that condition qualifies as an 'item' within the meaning of
[s]ection 16 .... ,,7" He then provided some basic or general ap-
proaches to state constitutional interpretation, 77 followed by a care-
ful textual analysis:
Construing "item" for purposes of [a]rticle IV, [s]ection 16 of
our Constitution as any part of an appropriation bill would de-
prive the [s]ection 16 phrase "item[s] of appropriation" of any
effect and therefore must be disfavored. Moreover, it seems
evident that, in initially using in [s]ection 16 the phrase
"item[s] of any bill making appropriations of money," the focus
was not on providing a precise definition of "item" but on dis-
75. 953 A.2d at 523-25. Chief Justice Castille pointed out that "this author has sug-
gested that state constitutional holdings, in the comparative area, that are unsupported by
an Edmunds analysis have less secure constitutional footing." Id. at 523 n. 10. He also noted
that even though the Edmunds factors were not required in cases that did not seek an inter-
pretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution beyond an identical or similar provision of the
Federal Constitution, arguments presented according to at least some of the Edmunds crite-
ria could prove useful. Id. at 525 n.12.
76. Id. at 526.
77. Id. at 528; see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 314.
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tinguishing the type of bill to which the Constitution was re-
ferring (i.e., an appropriation bill) from that to which it had
been referring in [a]rticle IV, [s]ection 15 (i.e., general legisla-
tion). Thus, the context of [s]ection 16 indicates that a provi-
sion of an appropriation bill is an item if it directs that a spe-
cific sum of money be spent for a particular purpose. 78
He then reviewed, and distinguished, decisions from a number of
sister states dealing with their item veto provisions. 79 He then con-
cluded that: "Article IV, [s]ection 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion prohibits the Governor from effectively vetoing portions of the
language defining an appropriation without disapproving the funds
with which the language is associated. °80
D. Judicial Authority over Sentencing
In Commonwealth v. Mockaitis,81 Justice Castille dealt with a
statute that required sentencing courts to order installation of ap-
proved ignition interlock systems for serial DUI defendants.8 2 After
resolving jurisdictional issues, he concluded that legislation requir-
ing the judiciary to perform ministerial "executive" functions - in-
cluding ensuring the systems have been installed and reporting to
the Department of Transportation - were unconstitutional intru-
sions into judicial authority.83 In other words, the legislature en-
croached on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's supervisory author-
ity by assigning executive functions ("deputize") to employees of the
courts.8 4 Justice Castille stated:
This scheme essentially forces court employees to serve the
function of the Department of Transportation in discharging
its executive responsibility of regulating whether and when re-
peat DUI offenders are entitled to conditional restoration of
their operating privileges.8 5
78. Id. at 531-32.
79. Id. at 534-35. This kind of reference to the constitutional decisions of other states
is, of course, unavailable in federal constitutional interpretation.
80. Id. at 537.
81. 834 A.2d 488, 490 (Pa. 2003).
82. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7001-03. This law was passed to respond to the "coercive
effect" of a condition of receiving federal highway funds. Mockaitis, 834A.2d at 491.
83. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d at 499.
84. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10).
85. Id. at 500.
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E. Legislative and Judicial Pay Raises and a Coercive
Nonseverability Clause
In 2005, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, utilizing an abbre-
viated process without floor debate at 2:00 a.m., enacted a law
providing for pay raises and future linkage to federal pay levels for
officials in all three branches of government ("Act 44").86 The en-
actment of this law, which included a legislative pay raise, stimu-
lated a firestorm of popular outrage. In response, the General As-
sembly repealed Act 44 in its entirety.8 7 Normally, such a legisla-
tive about-face would not have caused any constitutional problems.
However, the provision of Act 44 concerning legislators had delayed
their actual salary increase, but granted an immediate increase in
"unvouchered expenses" that was exactly equal to the future pay
raise. The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the legislature from
increasing its own pay during the term for which it has been
elected.88 Notably in this context, however, the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution also prohibits judicial salaries from being reduced.8 9 As a
result, the argument could be made that the legislative pay raise in
Act 44 ("unvouchered expenses") was unconstitutional, but that the
effect of Act 72, the repealing legislation taking away an enacted
judicial pay raise, was also unconstitutional.
Litigation was filed concerning this whole situation and finally
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2006.90 Justice Cas-
tille wrote the opinion for the court, with Chief Justice Ralph Cappy
recusing himself, most likely because he had published several edi-
torials endorsing the judicial pay raise.91 There was a serious state
constitutional challenge to the legislative procedure leading to the
adoption of Act 44. This was based upon the provisions in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution providing certain requirements for the enact-
ment of statutory law. 92 These provisions, aimed at transparent
governance in a democracy, require bills to contain no more than
one subject, which is expressed in its title, not to be altered on their
passage through the legislature to change their original purpose, to
be referred to committee, and considered on three different days in
86. Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 201, No. 44. See Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 925
(Pa. 2006).
87. Act of November 16, 2005, P.L. 385, No. 72 [hereinafter Act 72].
88. PA. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
89. PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(a).
90. Stilp, 905 A.2d at 918.
91. Id. at 925.
92. PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4. See generally Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Limits on Legislative Procedure: Problems of Judicial Enforcement and Legislative Compli-
ance, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987).
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each house. It is possible that the more cautious course for Justice
Castille and the court would have been simply to declare the entire
Act 44 unconstitutional as violative of these legislative procedure
provisions. After detailed analysis, however, Justice Castille ap-
plied a deferential analysis to uphold the Act's legislative proce-
dure.93
In a fairly transparent attempt to deny the court the judicial pay
raise if it struck down the legislative "pay raise," the General As-
sembly included in Act 44 a "nonseverability provision. ' 94 In other
words, if the court were to strike down the legislative provision the
legislative intent was to have the judicial pay raise go down with it.
Justice Castille provided a deep analysis of the question of the en-
forcement of nonseverability clauses, in a context where it seems to
have been included in an attempt to coerce the court not to strike
down the legislative pay raise. Relying on an important scholarly
article,95 he stated:
Kameny describes the use of a nonseverability provision as
"serv[ing] and in terrorem function, as the legislature attempts
to guard against judicial review all together by making the
price of invalidation too great." Id. at 1001. This sort of prac-
tice, he continues, is "especially troubling" because it "repre-
sent[s] an attempt by the legislature to prevent the judiciary
from exercising a power that rightly belongs to it. . . . These
clauses, in other words, amount to coercive threats. '96
Thus, what might have seemed to be an ordinary expression of
legislative intent concerning the possibility of partial invalidation
of a statute was revealed to be a separation of powers violation in
attempting to coerce the Pennsylvania Supreme Court not to per-
form its constitutional function of judicial review. Justice Castille
noted that retribution against the courts by other branches of gov-
ernment was unacceptable. He continued:
In this case, the potential "retribution" is built into the statute
itself in the would-be automatic effect of the nonseverability
provision. It is improper, to say the least, for the Legislature
to put a coequal branch of government in such a position.
93. Stilp, 905 A.2d at 951-59.
94. Id. at 970.
95. Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 997, 997-
98 (2005); see generally Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of
Law, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 227, 267-68 (2004).
96. Stilp, 905 A.2d at 979 (also citing Israel E. Friedman, Inseverability Clauses in Stat-
utes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 919-20 (1997)).
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Whether this effect is the sole or primary purpose of the non-
severability provision, and whether it is entirely deliberate, is
of less importance than the fact of its existence in such legisla-
tion, and the obvious influence such a provision might be de-
signed to exert over the independent exercise of the judicial
function. In a case such as this, we conclude, enforcement of
the clause would intrude upon the independence of the Judici-
ary and impair the judicial function. Accordingly, we will not
enforce the clause but instead we will effectuate our independ-
ent judgment concerning severability.97
Based on this assertion of judicial independence, Justice Castille
held that the unvouchered expense provision was unconstitutional,
and could be validly severed from the "other-wise-constitutionally
valid" portions of Act 44, including the judicial pay increase. 98 In
an earlier decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld
another legislative increase in "unvouchered expenses." 99 Justice
Castille distinguished this earlier decision, concluding that in this
instance the increased unvouchered expenses had no reasonable re-
lationship to actual expenses. 100 Next, the portion of Act 72 pur-
porting to repeal the judicial pay raise was deemed unconstitutional
as an invalid attempt to reduce judicial salaries. 101
This decision also drew a firestorm of criticism. Again, possibly
the more cautious approach would have been simply to declare Act
44 unconstitutional ab initio, therefore invalidating the pay in-
creases for all three branches. Viewed objectively, however, Justice
Castille's analysis seems proper, or at least defensible. Seen in this
light, it could be characterized as a courageous decision, in the face
of almost certain political criticism as a self-serving act of judicial
review.
F. Pennsylvania Constitution's Appropriations Clause Preempted
by Federal Statute
Pennsylvania's Constitution, like those in most states, provides
that no money may be expended by state government unless appro-
priated by law.102 For a number of years prior to 2009, when the
97. Id. at 980.
98. Id. at 981.
99. Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323 (1986).
100. Stilp, 905 A.2d at 969-70.
101. Id.
102. PA. CONST. art. III, § 24.
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governor and legislature could not agree on a budget or appropria-
tions bill by the end of the fiscal year, Governor Edward Rendell
took the position that he would have to furlough state employees
who he deemed nonessential to the health and safety of the state.
My wife, Alaine Williams, representing the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees, contended that the Fed-
eral Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted, under the Fed-
eral Supremacy Clause, 10 3 the state constitution's appropriation
provision.1 0 4 The governor had been using his view that he could
not pay state employees as grounds to bargain with the legislature
for programs he wanted in the budget. The union, by contrast, did
not want its members to miss paydays ("payless paydays") as bar-
gaining chips in larger political controversies. The union sought a
declaratory judgment that the state constitution's appropriations
provision was preempted by the FLSA, therefore depriving the gov-
ernor of the argument that he had to furlough state employees. The
matter made its way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and in an
opinion by Chief Justice Castille, the court agreed with the union,
and declared that the FLSA did in fact preempt the Pennsylvania
Constitution's appropriations clause. Chief Justice Castille stated:
The Union Parties asserted that Section 6 of FLSA preempts
[a]rticle III, [s]ection 24 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Therefore, according to the Union Parties, the view held by the
Governor and others in the Administration that [s]ection 24
bars the Commonwealth from continuing to employ and pay all
FLSA-covered employees, if a general appropriations act is not
enacted by the start of the Commonwealth's new fiscal year,
was erroneous as a matter of law.
Therefore, we conclude that through conflict preemption, Con-
gress' intent for Section 6 of FLSA to preempt state law provi-
sions such as [s]ection 24 is manifest and clear, and that the
presumption against preemption that the Executive Parties
rely upon to argue that Section 6 does not displace [s]ection 24
is presently overcome. Furthermore, since [s]ection 24 is
103. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
104. Council 13 AFSCME ex rel. Fillman v. Rendell, 986 A.2d 63 (Pa. 2009).
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preempted, [s]ection 24 is without effect in this instance and
thus, ceases to have legal significance. Accordingly, we hold
that the Union Parties are entitled to the declaratory judgment
they sought: that [s]ection 24 did not prohibit the Common-
wealth from continuing to employ and pay all FLSA nonexempt
Commonwealth employees in the event that the Pennsylvania
General Assembly failed to pass a budget by July 1, 2008.105
There have been no payless paydays since.
This holding by Chief Justice Castille illustrates a fundamental
characteristic of state constitutions within our federal system: Un-
der the Supremacy Clause, provisions of state constitutions may be
preempted or even unconstitutional, as contrary to the United
States Constitution or valid federal statutes such as FLSA. 1° Just
as in the area of reapportionment, Chief Justice Castille recognized
that the Pennsylvania Constitution must coexist, in a subservient
position, with the U.S. Constitution and laws.
The state defendants in this litigation argued all along that it was
a nonjusticiable "political question."10 7 Under this doctrine, state
courts should not intrude upon authority assigned to a co-equal
branch of government by the Constitution.108 Just as with the doc-
trine of mootness, as with many other doctrines, the political ques-
tion doctrine may be viewed differently by state courts under state
constitutions than it is viewed by the United States Supreme Court
under the U.S. Constitution. 10 9 The portion of Chief Justice Cas-
tille's opinion concerning the political question doctrine is a land-
mark in Pennsylvania. His analysis included the following im-
portant statement:
The happenstance that the preemption issue the Union Parties
posed to the court arises in political circumstances, when a
budget impasse was looming and the Governor was announc-
ing furlough options and decisions, does not change the nature
of the jurisprudential issue from one of law that the courts are
to decide, to one of executive policy that the courts are not to
consider. . . . [T]he political question doctrine is a shield, not
a sword. The doctrine exists to protect the Executive branch
from intrusion by the courts into areas of political policy and
executive prerogative; it does not exist to remove a question of
105. Id. at 70, 82.
106. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 99.
107. Fillman, 986 A.2d at 73-74.
108. Id. at 74.
109. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 298-99.
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law from the Judiciary's consideration merely because the Ex-
ecutive branch has forwarded its own opinion of the legal issue
in a political context. 110
Chief Justice Castille's political question analysis caught the at-
tention of a leading state constitutional scholar, writing about the
doctrine. Dean Daniel B. Rodriguez of Northwestern University
School of Law cited the case and quoted it in support of his thesis
that "[s]tate courts have engaged in fairly substantial policy-type
interventions" and "self-confidence has been a conspicuous part of
the doctrine in the decided cases." '
G. Sovereign Immunity and Governmental Torts
In 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted the case of
a schoolgirl who was terribly injured by a school bus operated by a
school district.11 2 She sued the school district and received a multi-
million dollar jury verdict, which was then reduced by the trial
court to $500,000 pursuant to Pennsylvania's Tort Claims Act. 11 3
This statutory "damage cap" was enacted by the legislature pursu-
ant to article I, section 11:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by
due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Com-
monwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases
as the Legislature may by law direct.1 1 4
Statutory caps on damages in civil litigation, against both private
and governmental defendants, can be categorized under the broad
heading of "Tort Reform. 111 In the absence of any meaningful fed-
eral constitutional arguments against such damage caps, it is the
state constitutions that had been in the forefront of constitutional
challenges to them.116 These cases have relied on a number of state
110. Fillman, 986 A.2d at 76.
111. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 573, 584 (2013).
112. Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2014).
113. Id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8501-8564.
114. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
115. Thirteenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law: Tort Reform and State Consti-
tutional Law, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001).
116. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Tort Reform and State Constitutional Law, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001).
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constitutional provisions such as right to remedy guarantees, right
to civil jury trial, separation of powers, as well as others.11 7
In the Zauflik litigation, the plaintiff relied on all of these argu-
ments, as well as an equal protection argument.1 18 When the case
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Chief Justice Castille, as
is his usual approach to state constitutional interpretation, pro-
vided an in-depth review of the history of limitation on damages
against governmental defendants, by contrast to private defend-
ants.11 9 In this instance, there were earlier cases directly on point
upholding such damage caps against governmental defendants. 120
Ultimately, relying substantially on prior precedent, but also on
the distinction between governmental and private defendants,
Chief Justice Castille upheld the damage cap. He stated:
Pennsylvania courts have struggled with the difficult questions
raised in this appeal-and the attendant policy implications-
since the very beginnings of our common law system. The facts
here are tragic, involving a school student who suffered griev-
ous injuries caused by the uncontested negligence of the school
district's employee. But, the circumstances are not unprece-
dented, and the lower courts did not err in relying on our prior
cases to uphold the legislation at issue, as against the present
constitutional challenges. Moreover, the conclusion that the
General Assembly is in the better position than this Court to
address the complicated public policy questions raised by the
larger controversy has substantial force. Accordingly, we up-
hold the limitation on damages recoverable under Section
8553(b) of the Act, and therefore affirm the order of the Com-
monwealth Court.121
In the portion of his opinion concerning the equal protection
claim, Chief Justice Castille relied, rather uncritically, on prior
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions interpreting the equality
provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be "coextensive"
with the Equal Protection Clause of The Fourteenth Amendment. 122
I have been quite critical of these earlier decisions interpreting the
117. Id. at 897-88.
118. See Zauflik, 104 A.3d 1096.
119. Id. at 1124.
120. Id. at 1125-26.
121. Id. at 1133.
122. Id. at 1117; see also Kramer v. W.C.A.B. (Rite Aid Corp.), 883 A.2d 518, 532 (Pa. 2005)
(explaining "same standards" and "coterminous").
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Pennsylvania constitutional equality provisions "in lockstep" with
Federal Equal Protection doctrine. 123
H. State Constitutional Environmental Protection
State constitutions contain a number of positive rights guaran-
tees, by contrast to the U.S. Constitution's more familiar negative
rights. 124 A number of state constitutions now contain environmen-
tal rights provisions. Pennsylvania's provision, dating from 1971,
provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including genera-
tions yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.1 25
In 2013, after remaining relatively dormant since 1971, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court breathed life into the clause in an opinion
by Chief Justice Castille.1 26 The leading authority on this provision,
John Dernbach, 27 analyzes this landmark decision in this issue of
the Duquesne Law Review.1 28
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear from this selection of opinions by Chief Justice Castille,
including those before he became Chief Justice, that he has delved
quite deeply into the Pennsylvania Constitution, confronting a wide
variety of circumstances where the state constitution must interact
with the U.S. Constitution. In virtually all of these opinions he has
123. Robert F. Williams, Pennsylvania's Equality Provisions, in GORMLEY, ET AL., supra
note 13, at 731; State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, supra note 4; WILLIAMS, supra note
7, at 211-29.
124. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013); Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1131 (1999).
125. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
126. Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (citing
Professor Dernbach prominently).
127. See John C. Dernbach, Natural Resources and the Public Estate, in GORMLEY ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 683.
128. John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for
Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335 (2013).
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explored the history of the relevant state constitutional clause (in-
cluding its interaction with the U.S. Constitution) often going all
the way back to 1776. Further, his opinions are useful in that they
thoroughly review the arguments of the parties, prior to his reach-
ing a holding. His opinions also provide a thorough history of the
prior litigation under the particular state constitutional provision
being reviewed. Also, he is attentive to the decisions of other states
under their constitutions that are identical or similar to the Penn-
sylvania constitutional provision under review.
If one were to read Chief Justice Castille's state constitutional
law opinions, all of the basics of this field would become apparent.
These opinions will shape Pennsylvania's constitutional interpreta-
tion for years to come. In sum, I agree with Professor Bruce Le-
dewitz' prediction: "He will go down in history as perhaps the justice
who has had more influence on the interpretation of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution than any other judge. 129
129. Chris Mondics, Ron Castille: From Vietnam valor and injury to historic tenure as Pa.
Chief Justice, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 12, 2015, at Al.
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